

Réminiscences 5

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Contacts scientifiques au temps
des Croisades

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BREPOLS

Mosul and Frederick II Hohenstaufen :
Notes on Aṭ iraddin al-Abhari and
Sirāğaddin al-Urmawi

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Frederick II Hohenstaufen is well known for having sent out the so-called « Sicilian questions » to different Arabic countries. Among the things the emperor wanted to know were :

What is the proof for the survival of the soul <after the death the body> ?

Where do Aristotle and Alexander <of Aphrodisias> disagree <on the soul>¹ ?

These and the other questions are extant in Arabic. They have survived together with the answers of the Arabic philosopher Ibn Sab'īn from Ceuta in Northwest Africa and have long been published and discussed. It is less well known that Frederick was also in contact with scholars from Mosul. The city on the west bank of the Tigris in Kurdistan would appear to be too far away to play a part in the encounter with the West. But in fact, 'Imād-ad-Dīn Zangī, who conquered Edessa in 1144, was the governor of Mosul, and troops from Mosul would take part time and again in the wars against

¹ M. AMARI, *Questions philosophiques adressées aux savants musulmans par l'empereur Frédéric II*, in *Journal Asiatique*, Ve sér., t. 1, 1853, p. 267-270 (Arabic and French), A.F. MEHREN, *Correspondance du philosophe Soufi Ibn Sab'īn Abd Oul-Haqq avec l'empereur Frédéric II de Hohenstaufen*, in *Journal Asiatique*, VII^e sér., t. 14, 1879, p. 406-408 (French), S. YALTKAYA, *Ibn Sabin. Correspondance philosophique avec l'empereur Frédéric II de Hohenstaufen*, Paris, 1943, p. 62, line 22 ; p. 81, line 20 to p. 82, line 3 (Arabic).

the Franks². Merchants and pilgrims travelled much between Mosul and Acre, an example being Ibn Jubair who in 1184 on his way back from Mekka took the route via Bagdad and Mosul to Acre, where he embarked on a ship to Spain.

It happens that one of the most respected scholars of thirteenth-century Islam was born in and lived most of his life in Mosul: Kamāladdīn Ibn Yūnus (1156 to 1242)³. He was a famous Shafi'ite theologian, also known for his knowledge of the mathematical sciences, philosophy (*al-hikma*) and medicine⁴. In fact, Kamāladdīn became so immersed in the rational sciences that he was accused of not being a true Muslim believer⁵. Unfortunately, most of his works have not survived. Instead, we have much information about his life, including many anecdotes, which show that Kamāladdīn was one of the main attractions of Mosul until his death in 1242.

I shall not go into this well-known material, but instead focus on his pupils⁶. Among these are a number of interesting names: there is Ibn Khallikān, the famous author of biographies, who was not exactly a pupil, but a friend of the family⁷; there is Naṣīraddīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, the well-known

² A convenient list of the Zangid rulers may be found in C.E. BOSWORTH, *The Islamic Dynasties*, Edinburgh, 1967, p. 121-122.

³ H. Suter has translated much biographical material on Kamāladdīn (from Ibn Khallikān, al-Qazwīnī, Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a and Barhebraeus) into German in his important article: H. SUTER, *Beiträge zu den Beziehungen Kaiser Friedrichs II. zu zeitgenössischen Gelehrten des Ostens und Westens, insbesondere zu dem arabischen Enzyklopädisten Kemāl ed-dīn ibn Yūnis*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mathematik bei den Griechen und Arabern* (= *Abhandl. z. Gesch. der Naturwissenschaften und Medizin*, t. 4), Erlangen, 1922, p. 1-8. In the following, I shall only give references to the Arabic texts of the authors mentioned.

⁴ C. BROCKELMANN, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, Supplementband I*, Leiden, 1937, p. 859. IBN ABĪ UṢAYBI'A mentions books on Quranic exegesis, Islamic law, medicine, logic, philosophy and astrology ('*Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā'*, ed. A. MÜLLER, Königsberg, 1884, t. 1, p. 308).

⁵ According to IBN KHALLIKĀN, *Wafayāt al-a'yān wa-anbā' abnā az-zamān*, ed. I. 'ABBĀS, Beirut, 1977, t. 5, p. 316-317. For an English translation see B.M. DE SLANE, *Ibn Khallikan's Biographical Dictionary*, Paris, 1842-71, t. 3, p. 466-474.

⁶ He used to teach in a Madrasa of a Mosque, which after his death was still known as <al-madrasa al-kamāliya> (according to IBN KHALLIKĀN, *Wafayāt al-a'yān...*, t. 5, p. 311, line 14).

⁷ His father was a good friend of Kamāladdīn, see H. SUTER, *Beiträge zu den Beziehungen...*, p. 2.

astronomer and philosopher⁸; there is the Christian philosopher Theodore from Antioch, who studied the works of al-Fārābī and Avicenna under Kamāladdīn⁹; and there are Aṭīraddīn al-Abharī and Sirāḡaddīn al-Urmawī, who would later become known as authors of encyclopedic works on philosophy. Mosul had obviously become a centre of learning. This is also reflected in reports saying that scholars from Damascus and Bagdad sent letters with questions to Kamāladdīn about problems in Euclid's geometry and Ptolemy's astronomy¹⁰.

How then did the contact come about between this circle of scholars in thirteenth-century Mosul and Frederick II Hohenstaufen? In remarkably many different ways. According to Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, an envoy of Frederick arrived at Mosul with the explicit wish to present a number of questions on astrology and other subjects to Kamāladdīn. The meeting took place, but only after the ruler of Mosul had asked Kamāladdīn not to wear his usual shabby clothing¹¹.

More reliable is another account, which comes from al-Qazwīnī, the well-known cosmographer. He is a pupil of an insider, the already mentioned al-Abharī. Qazwīnī relates that the Franks had sent letters to Syria (*aš-Šām*, probably to Damascus) in the time of Sultan al-Malik al-Kāmil, that is between 1218 and 1238. The Syrian scholars were able to answer the medical and philosophical questions, but had difficulties with the mathematical ones. The Sultan decided therefore to send them to al-Abharī in Mosul. But even al-Abharī had problems, and he presented the questions to Kamāladdīn, who found the solution. Al-Abharī then developed the proof, wrote everything down and sent it back to al-Malik al-Kāmil¹².

It is worth noticing that the Sultan did not send the letter to Kamāladdīn, but to al-Abharī. This suggests a rather late dating of the event, not much before 1238, when al-Abharī had already established his

⁸ See F.J. RAGEP, *Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Memoir on astronomy*, New York - Berlin etc., 1993, t. 1 (*Sources in the history of mathematics and physical sciences*, t. 12), p. 6-8, especially n. 23.

⁹ BARHEBRAEUS (Gregorius Abulfaragius), *Historia compendiosa dynastiarum*, ed. E. POCCOCK, Oxford, 1672, i, p. 521 (= *Mukhtaṣar ta'rīkh al-duwal*, ed. A. ṢĀLIHĀNĪ, Beirut, 1898, repr. 1958, p. 273); see C. BURNETT, *Master Theodore, Frederick II's Philosopher*, in *Federico II e le Nuove Culture, Atti del XXXI Convegno storico internazionale, Todi, 9-12 ottobre 1994*, Spoleto, 1995, p. 228 and p. 264.

¹⁰ IBN KHALLIKĀN, *Wafayāt al-a'yān...*, t. 5, p. 314-315.

¹¹ IBN ABĪ UṢAYBI'A, '*Uyūn al-anbā'*...', I, t. 1, p. 306.

¹² AL-QAZWĪNĪ, *Kitāb aṭār al-bilād*, ed. F. WÜSTENFELD, Göttingen, 1848 (reprint Frankfurt a.M., 1994), p. 310.

reputation and when Kamāladdīn, who died in 1242, was perhaps too old or too respected to be asked directly. We know in fact from other sources that al-Abharī was already a respected scholar in Mosul when he was still studying the *Almagest* under Kamāladdīn¹³. He probably comes from Abhar in north-western Iran, and he is credited with saying that he left his home town only because of his desire to work under Kamāladdīn in Mosul. In 1228 he was already based in Mosul and had become known as the author of astronomical books. Later in his life he spent some time in Byzantium¹⁴, but died back in Mosul in 1262 or 1265¹⁵.

I shall come back to al-Abharī, but should just like to point out that contacts between Mosul and Frederick II were not restricted to letters and envoys. Two scholars from the Mosul circle travelled to Italy in order to stay at Frederick's court: Theodore of Antioch, the emperor's philosopher, and Sirāgaddīn al-Urmawī. I shall not say much about Theodore, whose life and writings have been studied recently by Charles Burnett¹⁶, but focus on al-Urmawī. We know extremely little about him; only few testimonies survive. One comes from the historian Ibn Wāṣil:

Al-Malik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ <Nāgmaddīn Ayyūb> sent to the Emperor <Frederick II> the learned shaikh Sirāgaddīn al-Urmawī, now Qāḍī of Asia Minor, and he spent some time as the Emperor's honoured guest and wrote a book on Logic for him. The Emperor loaded him with honours. After this, still in high favour, he returned to al-Malik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ¹⁷.

¹³ IBN KHALLIKĀN, *Wafayāt al-a'yān...*, t. 5, p. 313, line 17.

¹⁴ BARHEBRAEUS, *Historia compendiosa...*, p. 485 (Arabic), p. 317 (Latin by Pococke): *In this time there was a group of pupils of the Imam Fakhraddīn ar-Rāzī, excellent men and authors of important works on logic and philosophy, such as ... in Khurasan, ... in Egypt, ... in Damascus, Aḥraddīn al-Abharī in Rūm (Byzantium), ... and Sirāgaddīn al-Urmawī in Konya.*

¹⁵ Most of this information can be drawn from Ibn Khallikān's description of Kamāladdīn's life (*Wafayāt al-a'yān*, t. 5, p. 313, lines 4 and 23), which has been referred to several times above. This material was known to Suter, but seems to have fallen into oblivion recently; G.C. ANAWATI, *Abharī Samarqandī*, in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, t. 1, London, 1985, p. 216, incorrectly maintains that *the only facts known about his life are that he was born and educated in Mosul but moved to Erbel (Arbela) in 625/1228. He was the disciple of Kamāl-al-dīn b. Yūnos and the teacher of Ebn Khallikān.*

¹⁶ C. BURNETT, *Master Theodore...*, p. 225-285.

¹⁷ F. GABRIELI, *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, London, 1969, p. 276 (original: *Storici Arabi delle Crociate*, Rome, 1957, p. 260). Gabrieli translates from ms Paris Ar. 1702, f. 121r, which I have not seen. The multi-volume edition of Ibn Wāṣil's work by J. ŠAYYĀL (Cairo, 1953-1972) has not yet reached the 1240s.

This episode can be dated to between 1240 and 1249, the time when Al-Malik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Nāgmaddīn Ayyūb reigned in Egypt—thus only a few years before Frederick II's death in 1250¹⁸. Another testimony comes from as-Subkī's biographical work on Shafi'ite theologians, which mentions al-Urmawī first as the author of works on Islamic law and on logic, and then goes on to say:

He studied in Mosul under Kamāladdīn Ibn Yūnus. He was born in the year 594 <i.e. 1198 A.D.> and died in the year 682 <i.e. 1283 A.D.> in Konya¹⁹.

The fact that al-Urmawī died in Konya, the capital of the Seljuqs of Rūm in central Anatolia, agrees very well with an account by Barhebraeus (who mentions al-Urmawī among the pupils of Rāzī in Konya)²⁰ and with what is said in the first testimony, namely that he is <now Qāḍī of Asia Minor>. Ibn Wāṣil was writing this some time after 1277²¹, which indicates that this exalted position was al-Urmawī's last in a remarkable life, which had seen him held in high esteem in the Ayyubid, Frankish and Seldjuk capitals.

To recapitulate: We have seen Kamāladdīn ibn Yūnus and al-Abharī in indirect contact with Frederick II, via letters and envoys, and Theodore of Antioch and al-Urmawī present at the royal court in Italy. This is interesting; more interesting would be to know what they actually talked or wrote about. Al-Abharī's and Kamāladdīn's solution of the geometrical problem is extant; we do not know whether it reached the Franks. From Theodore of Antioch we have a short *Letter on regimen* dedicated to Frederick II²² and a prologue to a translation²³, both in Latin. But this is all. There is hardly any material for studying the intellectual profile of Theodore and Kamāladdīn, because so few of their writings have survived. The case is different with al-Abharī and al-Urmawī. We shall therefore

¹⁸ C.E. BOSWORTH, *The Islamic Dynasties...*, p. 59. His reign in Egypt must be meant by Ibn Wāṣil (and not that in Damascus 1245-1249 or Diyarbakr 1232-1239) because he is called the successor of al-Malik al-'Adil Sayfaddīn who reigned in Egypt from 1238 to 1240.

¹⁹ AS-SUBKĪ, *Ṭabaqātu š-šāfi'iyyati l-kubrā*, t. 8, p. 371.

²⁰ See note 14 above.

²¹ Ibn Wāṣil himself is a very interesting figure: in the year 1261 he went to the Frankish court as an envoy of Baybars to King Manfred, the son of Frederick II (F. GABRIELI, *Arab Historians...*, p. xxxi and 277).

²² C. BURNETT, *Master Theodore...*, p. 236-238 (study) and 267-274 (text and translation).

²³ C. BURNETT, *op. cit.*, p. 238-247 (study) and 274-284 (text and translation).

ask : what are the intellectual standpoints of these two scholars from Mosul ?

Al-Abhari's and al-Urmawi's writings have never been printed or studied, and I have therefore decided not to examine their widely read logical writings, but to chose a topic which I am familiar with and which Frederick II, as we know from the Sicilian questions quoted above, was eager to obtain answers on : psychology.

Al-Abhari and al-Urmawi both wrote compendia of philosophy (*al-hikma*), in which they cover psychology in the section on natural philosophy (*ṭabīʿiyāt*). Let us start with al-Abhari's account, which is considerably shorter. His compendium is called : *Hidāyat al-hikma*, « Guidance in philosophy », and covers logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics²⁴. The book is in fact one of the most successful in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Islam and was commented and super-commented upon by numerous scholars²⁵. In the section on natural philosophy he talks firstly about bodies in general, clarifying basic concepts such as place, time, motion etc., secondly about the stars and thirdly about the elements. Under the last heading we find the four elements, meteorology, mineralogy and finally a psychological section on plants, animals and human beings (translated in the Appendix below). Al-Abhari's theory of the soul is a straightforward faculty-psychology : he lists the three vegetative faculties and defines them, *i.e.* the faculties of nutrition, growth and reproduction, then (under the heading « animals ») the five external senses and the internal senses –common sense, imagination (*khayāl*), estimation (*wahm*), memory, and the distinguishing faculty (*al-mutafarriqa*). He then treats the motive faculties and finally comes to the rational soul, which is the last part of the section on natural philosophy. What would al-Abhari have said if he had been asked by the Frankish envoy about the human soul ? According to his *Guidance in philosophy*, he would probably have covered the following points :

The practical faculty moves the body of the human being to particular actions ...

²⁴ The title of Abhari's work may already indicate his partisanship to the Avicennian tradition, since Avicenna himself had written a summa entitled *al-Hidāya* (« The Guidance ») ; on this work see D. GUTAS, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Leiden, 1988, p. 258-259.

²⁵ C. BROCKELMANN, *Geschichte... , Band I*, p. 608-611, and *Supplementband I*, p. 839-844.

The intellective faculty has different degrees, ... the material intellect, ... the intellect in habitu, ... the intellect in actuality ..., ... the acquired intellect ...

The intellective faculty is free of matter ...

The soul does not know by means of bodily organs ...

The souls are created <and not existent before the bodies> ...²⁶

In content and wording, this is pure Avicennian philosophy. For most of al-Abhari's sentences identical counterparts can be found in Avicenna's *De anima* from the *Šifā'*²⁷ and the psychological section of the *Nağāt*. Since al-Abhari's text on the rational soul consists of only twenty lines (in MS Gotha orient. A 1217, which I have used), we have here a radical abridgement of Avicenna's psychology which for instance does not mention the conjunction of the human intellect and the separate active intellect.

What has changed in the 350 years after Avicenna's death is restricted to matters of terminology : for example instead of al-Abhari's term *al-mutafarriqa*, <the distinguishing faculty>, one would find in Avicenna *al-mutakhayyila*, <the imaginative>, and *al-mufakkira*, <the cogitative faculty>²⁸. To give another example : in his psychological works, Avicenna would not use the term *al-badihiyāt*, <axioms>, to describe the objects of the intellect *in habitu*, but the term *al-ma'qūlāt al-ūlā*, <first principles>²⁹. Some changes, however, have a bearing on the content of the doctrine. Abhari writes for instance that the intelligibles <are stored> in the intellect in actuality, whereas Avicenna, who denies the existence of intellectual memory, maintains that they <are, as it were, stored> in this intellect³⁰. Abhari has left out the *ka-anna*, <as it were>.

One can also notice the absence of any illuminationist theories in al-Abhari's *Hidāya* ; rather, it belongs to the same genre as the philosophical encyclopedias by Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghādī and Fakhraddīn ar-Rāzī.

²⁶ These are key sentences from the text fully translated in the Appendix.

²⁷ AVICENNA, *De anima*, ed. F. RAHMAN, London, 1959, chapters I.5, V.2, V.6. See the notes to the English translation in the Appendix.

²⁸ See the *Lexique latino-arabe* and *arabo-latin* in Van Riet's edition of Avicenna's *De anima*.

²⁹ AVICENNA, *De anima*, ed. RAHMAN, I.5, p. 49, line 7.

³⁰ AVICENNA, *De anima*, ed. RAHMAN, p. 49, line 18.

These books carry much Aristotelian material in Avicennian form³¹. Al-Abhari's very popular handbook of philosophy has the same role of continuing the Peripatetic tradition. As an example, I may refer to a fifteenth-century anonymous commentator on al-Abhari's *Hidāya*, who differentiates, for instance, at length the Peripatetic criteria for demarcating the internal senses³².

To return to Mosul in the thirteenth century: it is very likely that Kamāladdīn's philosophy looked very similar to al-Abhari's. A hint of this is that Kamāladdīn is said to have understood the works of ar-Rāzī very well and that he was well-versed in philosophy, which is divided into the three parts of the Avicennian tradition: logic, physics, metaphysics³³. Also, we know that Theodore read al-Fārābī and Avicenna under him. The Avicenna quotations in Theodore's Latin works may well be an indication of his upbringing in Mosul³⁴.

In fact, we have to confess that Frederick II or his envoy would probably not be satisfied with al-Abhari's answer. For what Frederick wanted to know in his Sicilian questions is how to prove the immortality of the soul. He could have got an answer from al-Urmawī, the man who wrote a book on logic for him.

Unfortunately, the manuscript situation is much worse for al-Urmawī than for al-Abhari. The logic part of his compendium *Maṭāli' al-anwār* («The Rising of Lights») has survived in a number of manuscripts and was in fact often commented upon³⁵, but the second part—which is called *ilāhiyāt*, «metaphysics» and also covers natural philosophy—has only survived in the lemmata of a commentary by Ruknaddīn al-Astarābādī, who died in 1315 A.D. (this is MS Berlin or. oct. 1487)³⁶. The lemma

³¹ On this tradition see F.E. PETERS, *Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam*, New York - London, 1968, p. 104-120, and G. ENDREß, *Die wissenschaftliche Literatur*, in W. FISCHER, ed., *Grundriß der Arabischen Philologie*, Bd III: Suppl., Wiesbaden, 1992, p. 57-61.

³² Ms Oxford Marsh 405 (= Uri 516), f. 42r-v.

³³ IBN KHALLIKĀN, *Wafayāt al-a'yān...*, p. 312, line 8.

³⁴ C. BURNETT, *Master Theodore...*, p. 243-244.

³⁵ C. BROCKELMANN, *Geschichte...*, Band I, p. 614-615, and *Supplementband I*, p. 848-849.

³⁶ For information about this manuscript and about al-Astarābādī see R. SELLHEIM, *Materialien zur arabischen Literaturgeschichte*, t. 1 Stuttgart, 1976, p. 153-157. I am grateful to Gerhard Endreß for bringing the Berlin manuscript to my attention. Jean Michot has kindly pointed out to me that the numerous references to al-Urmawī in IBN TAYMĪYA'S *Kitāb dar' ta'arūḍ al-'aql wa-l-naql*, ed. M.R. SĀLIM, t. 1-11, Cairo, 1971-, offer further possibilities to study al-Urmawī's psychological theories.

usually gives at least two or three words of al-Urmawī's text, if not a whole sentence. Al-Urmawī, just as al-Abhari, goes through the faculties of the vegetative and the animal soul. He then has five chapters on the rational soul:

Fourth chapter on the essence of the soul and on abstraction <from matter>

Fifth chapter on the attributes of the soul

Sixth chapter on states of the soul after the death of the body

Seventh chapter on bodily resurrection

Eighth chapter on the remaining discourse on the soul³⁷

It is obvious that Avicenna has also left his stamp on Urmawī's philosophy. Al-Urmawī in fact mentions the *ṣaiḥh*, i.e. Avicenna, once in the discussion of the internal senses, and al-Astarābādī gives two references, one to the psychological section of the *Canon*, book 1, and one to *De anima*³⁸. The topics and conclusions in al-Urmawī are very similar to those of Avicenna: the immateriality of the soul is proved with arguments from the Avicennian tradition, as for instance the argument that the intellect is capable of introspection, whereas bodily faculties are not³⁹, and the argument that intelligible forms are not divisible⁴⁰. The topic of bodily resurrection (the seventh chapter) and the refutation of the theory of transmigration (*tanāsukh*)⁴¹ are also part of Avicenna's psychology. One finds Avicenna's theory of the createdness of the soul⁴² and of its individuation⁴³.

However, we are far away here from al-Abhari's rephrasing of Avicennian psychology. Even though al-Urmawī's section must have been much longer and much more detailed than al-Abhari's, he does not seem to mention the practical and the theoretical/intellective intellect, nor the hierarchy of intellects, nor the theory of the separate active intellect—at least not in the extant lemmata. Interestingly enough, al-Urmawī is less

³⁷ See the Appendix for the Arabic text and full references to the ms.

³⁸ Ms Berlin or. oct. 1487, f. 134v, lines 19-24.

³⁹ Ms Berlin or. oct. 1487, f. 137v, line 9. Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* V,2, ed. RAHMAN, p. 216-217.

⁴⁰ Ms Berlin or. oct. 1487, f. 136v, line 7. Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* V,2, p. 209-210.

⁴¹ Ms Berlin or. oct. 1487, f. 141v, line 12 (transmigration is a recurrent topic until f. 143r). Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* V,4, p. 234.

⁴² Ms Berlin or. oct. 1487, f. 141r, lines 19-21. Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* V,3, p. 223-224.

⁴³ Ms Berlin or. oct. 1487, f. 141v, line 15. Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* V,3, p. 224-225.

concerned with the more Aristotelian doctrines in Avicenna, such as the potential and active intellect, but rather draws on Avicenna's theory of the soul's afterlife, which was not covered by Aristotle. The metaphysics of the rational soul had been made a subject of its own by Avicenna; he had given it a systematic place in his *summae* as the second section of the theology part of metaphysics⁴⁴.

Whereas al-Abhari could have got all his knowledge of psychology from one book by Avicenna, al-Urmawi certainly betrays the influence of other writers, one of whom is the already mentioned Fakhraddin ar-Rāzī⁴⁵. The vocabulary of the chapter headings, for instance the phrases *al-hayawān al-arḍī*, <terrestrial animals>, *al-idrakāt al-bāṭina* for <internal perceptions>, *ṣifāt an-nafs*, <the attributes of the soul> and *tajarrud*, <abstraction>, probably come from Rāzī's compendium *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiya*, which has close parallels in structure with al-Urmawi's psychological section⁴⁶.

Frederick II would probably have been satisfied with these answers: al-Urmawi would argue philosophically in favour of the immateriality of the soul, he would say that it is created together with the body, but immortal, that there is no transmigration of the souls and that there are in fact different opinions among philosophers and Muslim believers on resurrection.

This would have contrasted a great deal with what Frederick was likely to have heard from his Latin philosophers. Michael Scot, who is a person he could have asked, has a chapter on the soul in his *Liber Introductorius*, but offers a much less satisfactory account⁴⁷: new philosophical ideas from Aristotle and Avicenna had only just begun to enter Western thought, and one could not yet find someone like al-Urmawi who discusses the soul's afterlife with purely philosophical arguments.

⁴⁴ D. GUTAS, *Avicenna...*, p. 254-261.

⁴⁵ Note that both al-Abhari and al-Urmawi are counted among Rāzī's pupils by Barhebraeus (see note 14 above).

⁴⁶ See RĀZĪ, *al-Mabāḥiṭ al-mašriqiya*, Tehran, 1966, t. 2, table of contents, p. 9-14. Rāzī structures his psychology as follows: (1) general points about the soul, (2) the vegetative faculties, (3) external perceptions, (4) internal perceptions, (5) the abstracted status of the soul, its createdness and survival after death, (6) the actions of the soul, (7) the state of the soul after the separation from the body, (8) the heavenly souls.

⁴⁷ Ms Escorial, Real Biblioteca, f. III. 8, fols 34ra-51ra. See P. MORPURGO, *Fonti di Michele Scotto*, in *Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Rendiconti della Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche*, serie 8, t. 38, 1983, p. 59-71, and my *Avicenna's De anima in the Latin West*, forthcoming, Part One, chapter on Michael Scot.

However, if what Ibn Sab'īn tells us is true, namely that Frederick II also wanted to know something about Aristotle's psychology and about Alexander of Aphrodisias, then our scholars from Mosul, who answered so many questions, might have had difficulties: for Avicenna had long replaced Aristotle as the prototype philosopher⁴⁸.

⁴⁸ I am grateful to Charles Burnett and Dimitri Gutas for their suggestions and corrections.

Appendix

I. The psychological section of Aṭiraddin al-Abhari's *Hidāyat al-ḥikma* (according to ms Gotha orient. A 1217, fols 8r-9v)

فصل في النبات وله قوة عديمة الشعور تصدر عنها حركات وافعال مختلفة بالالات وتسمى نفسا نباتيا (sic) وهي كمال اول لجسم طبيعي الي من جهة ما يتولد ويزيد ويغتنى فلها قوة غاذية وهي التي تحيل جسما اخر الي مشاكلة الجسم الذي هي فيه فتلتصق به بدل ما يتحلل عنه ولها قوة تامة وهي (//f.8v) التي تزيد في الجسم الذي هي فيه زيادة في اقطاره طولاً وعرضاً وعمقاً الي ان يبلغ كمال النشوء على تناسب طبيعي ولها قوة مولدة وهي التي تاخذ من الجسم الذي هي فيه جزءاً وتجعله مادة ومبداً تمثله والغاذية تجذب الغذاء وتمسكه وتهضمه وتدفع ثقله فلها قوة جاذبة وماسكة وهاضمة ودافعة الثقل و«الهاضمة» تقف على الفعل اولاً وتبقى الجاذبة بفعل الي ان تعجز.

فصل في الحيوان وهو مختص بالنفس الحيوانية وهي كمال اول لجسم طبيعي الي من جهة ما يدرك الجزئيات ويتحرك بالازادة فلها قوة مدركة ومتمركمة اما المدركة فهي اما في الظاهر او الباطن اما التي في الظاهر فهي البصر والسمع والشم والذوق واللمس واما التي في الباطن فهي الحس المشترك والخيال والوهم والحافظ والمتفرقة اما الحس المشترك وهي قوة مرتبة في التجويف الاول من الدماغ [أما] تقبل جميع الامور المنطبعة في الحواس الظاهرة وهي غير البصر لاننا نشاهد القطرة النازلة خطأ مستقيماً وليس ارتسامها في البصر اذ البصر لا يرسم فيه الا المقابل وهو القطرة والنقط فاذن ارتسامها لما يكون في قوة اخرى غير البصر واما الخيال فهي قوة تحفظ جميع امور المحسوسات وتمثلها بعد

الغيبوبة وهي خزانة الحس المشترك واما الوهم وهي قوة مرتبة في التجويف الاوسط من الدماغ تدرك المعاني الجزئية الموجودة في المحسوسات كالقوة الحاكمة في الشاة بان الذئب مهروب عنه والولد معطوف عليه واما الحافظة فهي قوة مرتبة في التجويف الاخير من الدماغ تحفظ ما تدركه القوة الوهمية من المعاني الغير المحسوسة الموجودة في المحسوسات وهي خزانة القوة (//f.9r) الوهمية واما المتفرقة فهي قوة مرتبة في البطن الاوسط من الدماغ من شأنها ان تتركب بعض ما في الخيال مع بعض وتفصل بعضها من بعض واما القوة المحركة فتتقسم الي باعثة وفاعلة اما الباعثة فهي التي اذا ارتسمت في الخيال صورة مطلوبة او مهروب عنها حملت الفاعلة على التحريك وهي ان حملت على تحريك يدفع به الشيء المتخيل ضاراً او مفسداً طلباً للغلبة تسمى قوة غضبية واما الفاعلة فهي التي تشنج العضلات للتحريك .

فصل في الانسان وهو مختص بالنفس الناطقة وهي كمال اول لجسم طبيعي الي من جهة ما يدرك الامور الكلية ويفعل الافعال الفكرية فلها قوة عاقلة تدرك بها التصورات والتصديقات وقوة عاملة تحرك بدن الانسان الي الافعال الجزئية بالفكر والروية على مقتضى آراء تخيقها (تخصها؟) .

وللقوة العاقلة مراتب المرتبة الاولى ان يكون خالية عن جميع المعقولات بل هي مستعدة لها وهي العقل الهبولاني والمرتبة الثانية ان تحصل لها المعقولات البديهية وينتقل من البديهيات الي النظريات وهي العقل بالملكة المرتبة الثالثة ان يحصل لها المعقولات التي لا يطالعها بل صارت مخزونة عنده وهي العقل بالفعل المرتبة الرابعة ان يطالع المعقولات المكتسبة وهي العقل المطلق ويسمى عقلاً مستفاداً ثم العقل بالملكة ان كان في الغاية يسمى قوة قدسية .

واعلم ان القوة العاقلة مجردة عن المادة لانها لو كانت ذات وضع فاما ان لا ينقسم او ينقسم لا سبيل الى الاول لان كل ما له وضع فهو منقسم على ما مر في نفي الجزء لا يتجزى ولا سبيل الى الثاني لان معقولاتها إن كانت بسيطة يلزم انقسامها (//f.9v) لان الحال في احد جزئها غير الحال في الجزء الاخر وان كانت مركبة وكل مركب هو انما يتركب عن البسيطات فيلزم انقسام تلك البسيطات حق (؟).

ونقول ايضا تعقل النفس ليس بالالة الجسدانية والا لما كان يعرض للالة كلال حيث لا يعرض للقوة كلال وليس كذلك لان البدن بعد الاربعين ياخذ في النقصان مع ان القوة هناك تاخذ في الكمال .

ونقول ايضا ان النفوس حادثة لانها لو كانت موجودة قبل البدن فالاختلاف بينها إما (؟) كان بالمهنة او لوازمها او لعوارضها المفارقة ولا جائز ان يكون بالمهنة ولوازمها لانها مشتركة وما به الاشتراك غير ما به الامتياز ولا جائز ان يكون بالعوارض المفارقة لان العوارض انما تلحق الشيء بسبب القوابل لان المهنة لا يستحق العوارض لذاتها والا لكان كل عارض لازما والقابل للنفس انما هو البدن فمتى لم يكن الابدان موجودة لم يكن النفوس موجودة فيكون حادثة ضرورة.

II. The psychological section of Sirāğaddīn al-Urmawī's *Maṭāli* 'al-anwār : chapter headings in the commentary of Ruknaddīn al-Astarābādī (Ms Berlin or. oct. 1487, fols. 116r-155r)

الفن الثاني في النفس مقدمة وابواب المقدمة في حقيقة (؟) النفس ...
 الباب الاول في القوى النباتية مقدمة القوى المشتركة من (؟) النبات والحيوان فقط (؟) ...
 الباب الثاني في الادراكات الظاهرة اقسام الاول في اللمس مباحث الاول الحيوان الارضى ...
 الباب الثالث في الادراكات الباطنة فالاول القوة المدركة اما مدركة للجزئيات ...
 الباب الرابع في ماهية النفس وتجرد مما اباحت الاول ما يشير اليه كل بقوله انما (؟) ...
 الباب الخامس في صفات النفس اباحت الاول اكابر الحكماء على ان الانسان هو النفس والبدن آله ...
 الباب السادس في احوال النفس بعد موت البدن اباحت الاول اتفقوا <القائلون> ببقاء النفس بعد موت البدن ...
 الباب السابع في المعاد الجسماني مذهب جمهور الفلاسفة ...
 الباب الثامن في بقية الكلام في النفس اباحت فالاول يزعم بعضهم ...
 الكتاب الرابع في العلم الاهي.

III. Aṭiraddin al-Abhari : English translation

(f.8r, line 12)

Chapter on plants : <The plant> has a faculty devoid of consciousness from which originate movements and different actions through organs ; it is called the vegetative soul. It is the first perfection of a natural body possessing organs insofar as it reproduces, grows and nourishes⁴⁹. <The vegetative soul> has the nourishing faculty, which transforms another body into something similar to the body in which it is, and it joins to it a replacement of what has been dissolved. It has the faculty of growth, which (// f.8v) produces –in the body in which it is– growth in its dimensions, *i.e.* length, breadth and depth, until it attains the perfection in growth according to natural proportion. It has the reproductive faculty, which takes a part from the body in which it is and makes it the matter and principle of <hereditary> resemblance⁵⁰. The nourishing <faculty> attracts nourishment, holds it, digests it and expels its burden. It has the attracting, holding, digesting and burden-expelling faculties⁵¹. The digestive <faculty> ceases to act first, whereas the attracting faculty remains in action until it becomes weak.

Chapter on animals : The special property of the animal is the animal soul. It is the first perfection of a natural body possessing organs insofar as it perceives particulars and moves voluntarily⁵². To it belong the perceiving and the moving faculties⁵³. The perceiving faculties either are internal or external⁵⁴. The external are vision, hearing, smelling, taste and touch. The internal are common sense, imagination, estimation, the memorizing and the distinguishing faculty. (1) Common sense is a faculty located in the first ventricle of the brain, which receives everything imprinted on the external senses⁵⁵. It is different from vision, because we observe a raindrop as falling in a straight line, but it is not <so> depicted

⁴⁹ AVICENNA, *De anima* I,5, p. 39, line 15. I do not give references to Van Riet's edition of the Latin translation, where the page numbers of Rahman's edition are given on the margin.

⁵⁰ AVICENNA, *De anima* I,5, p. 40, line 14 (the three vegetative faculties).

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 51, line 10.

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 39, line 18.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 41, line 4.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 41, lines 16-17.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 44, line 3.

in the eye since the only things that are depicted in it are what corresponds <to external reality>, and these are the raindrop and the points. Its depiction <as a line> therefore can only be in a faculty different from vision⁵⁶. (2) Imagination is a faculty which preserves all things perceived and represents them after the disappearance <of the objects>⁵⁷. It is the storing-place of common sense⁵⁸. (3) Estimation is a faculty located in the middle ventricle of the brain, which perceives particular 'connotational attributes'⁵⁹ existing in the sense-objects, such as the faculty in the sheep which judges that the wolf is something to flee from and the child is something to care for⁶⁰. (4) The memorizing faculty is a faculty located in the rear ventricle of the brain, which preserves the non-sensible 'connotational attributes' which exist in the sense-objects and are perceived by the estimative faculty⁶¹. It is the storing-place (// f.9r) of the estimative faculty⁶². (5) The distinguishing faculty is a faculty located in the middle portion of the brain whose function is to combine some things <stored> in imagination with others and separate some from others⁶³.

The moving faculty is divided into the ordering and the performing <faculty>. As for the ordering <faculty>, if a desired or feared form is imprinted in imagination, it rouses the performing <faculty> into movement ; if it causes a movement through which things imagined to be harmful or destructive are repulsed in an attempt to overcome <them>, it is called the faculty of anger. As for the performing <faculty>, it contracts the muscles to <produce> movement⁶⁴.

Chapter on human beings : The special property of human beings is the rational soul, which is the first perfection of a natural body possessing organs insofar as it perceives universal things and performs actions based on thought⁶⁵. It has an intellective faculty with which it perceives notions that are the product of either concept-formation or granting assent. The practical faculty moves the body of the human being to particular actions

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 44, line 11, - p. 45, line 2.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 44, line 6.

⁵⁸ Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* IV,1, p. 167, lines 5-6.

⁵⁹ 'Connotational attributes' is my rendering for *ma'āni*, which is traditionally, but ambiguously translated as 'intentions'.

⁶⁰ AVICENNA, *De anima* I,5, p. 45, line 6.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 45, line 11.

⁶² Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* IV,1, p. 167, line 8.

⁶³ AVICENNA, *De anima* I,5, p. 45, line 3.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 41, lines 6-16 (with some cuts).

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 40, line 1.

by way of thinking and deliberation according to what considerations that are specific for it demand⁶⁶.

The intellective faculty has <different> degrees. The first degree <is> that it is bare of all intelligibles and is <only> predisposed to <receive> them ; this is the material intellect. The second degree <is> that intuitive intelligibles come about in it and <that> it proceeds from the intuitive <intelligibles> to the theoretical <intelligibles> ; this is the intellect *in habitu*. The third degree <is> that in it intelligibles come about which it does not consider <at the moment> ; instead they are stored in it ; this is the intellect in actuality. The fourth degree <is> that it considers the acquired intelligibles ; this is the absolute intellect, which is called the acquired intellect. Then the intellect *in habitu*, if it is <in its> utmost <state>, is called the holy intellect⁶⁷.

You should know that the intellective faculty is free of matter. For if it possessed a location, then it would be either indivisible or divisible. There is no possibility for the first, because everything which has a location is divisible according to what we said above when refuting atomism. There is no possibility for the second either, because if its intelligibles are simple, then their division is necessary (// f.9v) since the state in one of their parts is different from the state in a different part. If they are composed –and everything composed is composed of simple <things>– then a division into these simple <things> is necessary (?)⁶⁸.

<We> also say : the soul does not know by means of bodily organs⁶⁹. If this were not the case, weakness and tiredness would not occur to the organ inasmuch as fatigue does not occur to the faculty. It is not like that, because the body after <the age of> forty begins to become defective, whereas the <rational> faculty then becomes increasingly more perfect⁷⁰.

We also say that the souls are created, because if they were existent before the bodies, the difference among them would be due either to occupation or their necessary attributes or separable accidents ; and it is impossible that it is due to occupation⁷¹ or their necessary attributes,

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 45, line 19.

⁶⁷ Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* I,5, p. 48, line 18, - p. 49, line 9. For the « holy intellect », see *De anima* V,6, p. 248, lines 17-18, and p. 250, line 4.

⁶⁸ Cf. AVICENNA, *De anima* V,2, p. 209-210.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 216, line 18.

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 219, line 11.

⁷¹ *Mihna* (occupation) : probably a misreading for *māhiyya*. Cfr AVICENNA, *De anima*, V, 3, p. 224-225.

because they are shared things and that which has sharing is different from that which has distinction <i.e., individuation>. It is impossible that it is due to separable accidents, because accidents are attached to a thing only in virtue of <there being> receiving things, since occupation in itself cannot lay claim to accidents. If it did, then each accident would be necessary. The thing, in fact, which receives the soul is the body. Hence, as long as the bodies are not existent, the souls will not be existent. Therefore they are created necessarily⁷².

IV. Sirāgaddīn al-Urmawī : English translation

(f.116r) Second part <of the third book> : on the soul. Introduction and chapters. Introduction on the quiddity/reality of the soul etc.

(f.117r) First chapter on the vegetative faculties. Introduction : the faculties shared by plants and animals only (?) etc.

(f.125r) Second chapter on external perceptions. Sections. The first is on touch. Inquiries. First. The terrestrial animals etc.

(f.133r) Third chapter on internal perceptions. As for the first perceiving faculty, it perceives particulars etc.

(f.135v) Fourth chapter on the essence of the soul and on abstraction <from matter>, among which <are> inquiries : the first, which everybody points to with his words, is that etc.

(f.139v) Fifth chapter on the attributes of the soul. Inquiries, the first : the greatest philosophers <agree> that the human being is the soul and that the body is its instrument etc.

(f.146v) Sixth chapter on states of the soul after the death of the body. Inquiries, the first : they agree –<who maintain> the survival of the soul after the death of the body– <on the existence of bliss> etc.

(f.149r) Seventh chapter on bodily resurrection. The doctrine of the common philosophers <is that there is resurrection only in the internal soul> etc.

(f.151r) Eighth chapter on the remaining discourse on the soul. Inquiries, the first : some of them maintain etc.

(f.155r) The fourth book on the divine science. Chapters.

⁷² *Ibidem*, p. 223-225.